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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model and examines how the long-run
outcome of an economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral pro-
ductivity. It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial
distribution must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
take education to acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an
adequate number of people can access education to acquire advanced skills. Both condi-
tions seem to have held in successful East Asian nations, where, as in the model economy
undergoing such transformation, the fraction of workers with advanced skills rose greatly
and inequalities between these workers and others fell over time. In contrast, if the former
condition holds but the latter does not, which would be the case for many nations falling
into ”middle income trap”, consistent with facts, the fraction of workers with basic skills
and the share of the modern sector rise, but inequality between workers with advanced
skills and with basic skills worsens and the traditional sector remains for long periods.
If the former condition does not hold, which would be true for poorest economies, the
dual structure and large inequality between workers without basic skills and others persist
for very long periods. Consistently, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) ﬁnd that both the
share of students with basic skills and that of top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
economic growth that are complementary each other.
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1 Introduction
In the post-WWII era, most developing economies had decent but not spectacular growth.
Except some oil-rich nations, only a small number of economies in East Asia and Europe
had persistent high growth and evolved into developed economies. With current income
levels and growth trends, the great majority of developing economies are unlikely to achieve
such transformation in near future.
The following facts on typical developing nations would corroborate such negative prospect.
First, the dual economic structure, i.e. the coexistence of the modern/formal sector charac-
terized by advanced technology, large establishment sizes, skilled jobs, and high wages, and
the traditional/informal sector with the contrasting features, is persistent (La Porta and
Shleifer, 2008; OECD, 2009).1;2 Second, although average years of schooling rose greatly,
quality of education remains low and thus skill accumulation, especially the growth of the
share of high-skill workers, seems to be modest, judging from persistent enormous gaps in
cognitive skills with developed nations (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008).3 Third, while
wage inequality between workers with and without basic skills (essential skills taught at the
primary and secondary education level) fell greatly, the inequality between workers with ba-
sic skills and with advanced skills rose over time (Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos, 2010).4
This might indicate that basic education has become less eﬀective in mitigating poverty and
taking further education, especially of good quality, is increasingly diﬃcult for the poor.
Why is the growth experience of typical developing economies unspectacular? How is it
1To be exact, the modern-traditional classiﬁcation is mainly based on technologies, while the formal-
informal one is mainly based on oﬃcial registrations of businesses, so they are distinct. Firms with modern
technology may choose the informal sector due to heavy regulations or taxation (OECD, 2009).
2The traditional/informal sector can be divided into the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture,
and the household production sector (see footnote 7). Rapid urbanization lowered the share of agricul-
tural employment signiﬁcantly, but it did not raise the share of the modern/formal sector greatly in many
countries. According to OECD (2009), informal employment, deﬁned as the sum of urban informal-sector
employment and formal-sector one without social protection (such as social security beneﬁts) accounts for
the majority of non-agricultural employment in developing economies.
3According to Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), the share of students without basic literacy in cognitive
skills is more than 30% (as high as 82%) in most developing nations, while it is less than 10% (as low as 3%)
in developed nations. Further, the share of high-performing students in the skills is more than 10% (as high
as 22%) in most developed nations, while it is less than 1% (as low as 0.1%) in many developing nations.
Reviewing the literature, they conclude that there is compelling evidence that cognitive skills, rather than
mere school attainment, are strongly related to individual earnings and economic growth.
4Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) combine estimated returns to education in developing nations
from recent cross-section studies (32 studies for 35 countries) with those from earlier studies (more than 100
studies using data from the 1960s to early 1990s), and ﬁnd that, on average, the return to primary education
fell rapidly over time and became lower than post-primary returns, which, particularly the return to tertiary
education, fell very moderately. Since quality of education deteriorated over time in most developing nations
due to rapid population growth under harsh budget, quality-adjusted returns to advanced education seem
to have risen. They also review a limited number of country studies using time-series data after the 1980s,
which ﬁnd that the return to tertiary education rose greatly and the one to primary education fell.
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related to the facts on economic structure, skill accumulation, and inequality? What diﬀer-
entiates a small number of the successful economies from them? To tackle these questions,
this paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model and examines how the long-run outcome
of an economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral productivity.
It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial distribu-
tion must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent and the size of ”middle class” is
enough. Both conditions seem to have held in successful East Asian nations largely because
of extensive land redistribution and eﬀective public school system, where, as in the model
economy undergoing such transformation, inequality between workers with advanced skills
and others fell over time (Wood, 1994). In contrast, if the former condition holds but the
latter does not, which would be the case for many economies falling into ”middle income
trap”, the fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector rise greatly,
but the fraction of workers with advanced skills grows only moderately, inequality between
these workers and those with basic skills worsens, and the traditional sector remains for
long periods, consistent with the above facts.5 If the former condition does not hold, which
would be true for poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between workers
without basic skills and others persist for very long periods.
The analysis is based on a deterministic small-open OLG economy populated by a con-
tinuum of two-period-lived individuals. In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from
her parent and spends it on assets and education. She must take basic education, which
corresponds to school and non-school education needed to acquire essential skills taught at
the primary and secondary education level in real economy, to become a middle-skill worker,
and more-costly advanced education to become a high-skill worker.6 No credit market for
education investment exists, so she cannot invest more than the received transfer. Since she
can spend wealth on assets too, she spends on education only if it is ﬁnancially accessible
and proﬁtable. In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on
basic consumption, non-basic consumption, and a transfer to her single child.
The economy is composed of up to two sectors, the modern sector producing good M
and the traditional sector producing good T . The modern sector using advanced technology
employs high-skill and middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector employs low-skill
workers. Both goods can be used for basic consumption, while only good M can be used
for non-basic consumption. In other words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food,
5Although skill-biased technical change is a possible contributor to the increasing inequality in recent
years, particularly in middle-income economies, Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) ﬁnd that this
trend started well before IT technologies became economically important (see footnote 4).
6Thus, in an economy where quality of school education is low, a large part of the cost of basic (advanced)
education is spending on non-school education such as private tutoring and education at cram school.
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and shelter, can be produced using either technology, while the advanced technology is
required to produce goods such as electric appliances and IT gadgets. It is assumed that
good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The traditional sector produces goods for
basic needs using primitive technology, thus it corresponds to the urban informal sector,
traditional agriculture, and the household production sector in real economy, all of which
supply goods mainly for domestic markets.7 By contrast, the modern sector corresponds
to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture, which compete more directly with
foreign producers. If good T is relatively cheap, only the traditional sector supplies goods
for basic consumption, otherwise, the modern sector too or only the sector does.
Because the distribution of wealth in the initial period is unequal and the inequality is
transmitted intergenerationally through transfers, generally, individuals are heterogeneous
in accessibility to two types of education. Hence, those without enough wealth cannot take
basic or advanced education even if the return to the education net of its cost is positive.
Their descendants, however, may become accessible to it if enough wealth is accumulated.
(Opposite is true for descendants of relatively wealthy individuals.)
Main results, which are concerned with the situation where sectoral productivities are
not very low, are summarized as follows. First, the model has four types of steady states,
which are diﬀerent in proportions of the poor (those who cannot access advanced education)
and the extreme poor (those who cannot access basic education), wage inequality, the size of
the traditional sector, etc. The best steady state (in terms of aggregate output, aggregate
net income, and average utility) has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty
(universal access to advanced education), low wage inequality (wages net of education costs
are equal), high relative price of basic consumption, and no traditional sector (thus goods
for basic consumption are totally supplied by the modern sector).8;9 Other three types of
steady states share the contrasting features, but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and
wage inequality: in one type, no extreme poverty (universal access to basic education)
but prevalent mild poverty, and high inequality between high-skill workers and others and
low inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers, features of many middle-income
economies; in another type, no mild poverty (those who can access basic education can
aﬀord advanced education) but widespread extreme poverty, and high inequality between
7The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services, such as petty trading of commodities and
basic meals, and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets. Traditional agriculture is operated
on a small scale by family farms and produces agricultural products mainly for basic needs of domestic
consumers. And, the household sector produces basic goods and services mostly for self-consumption.
8Since net returns of two types of education are equal, some individuals just take basic education.
9Although wage inequality rose in most developed economies in recent decades, the level of the inequality
is still much lower than a typical developing economy. Further, the cost of higher education too rose greatly
in many of the economies, thus disparities in wages net of education costs enlarged more moderately.
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low-skill workers and others and low inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers;
in yet another type, as observed in poorest economies, pervasive extreme and mild poverty
and typically high inequalities among the three types of workers.
Second, to which type of steady states the economy converges depends on the initial
distribution of wealth. In particular, for the best steady state to be realized, the initial
distribution must be such that the extreme poor are not large in number and the non-poor
must be enough relative to the poor.10 If the initial size of the extreme poor is large, the
dual structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and others (especially, high-
skill workers) remain in the long run, i.e. the economy converges to either of the last two
types of steady states. If its size is not large but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor,
the fraction of middle-skill workers and the share of the modern sector rise, and inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over time. However, inequality between
high-skill and middle-skill workers worsens, and typically the traditional sector remains in
the long run, i.e. the economy converges to the second type.
These results are obtained from the model with time-invariant sectoral productivities.
When the productivity of the modern sector grows continuously over time, ultimately, the
economy converges to the best steady state from any initial condition, but the speed of
convergence depends critically on the initial condition and thus the qualitative results of
the constant productivity case hold approximately. Hence, as stated earlier, the model can
explain the facts described at the beginning.11
The main implication is that, for fast modernization of an economy, the initial distribu-
tion of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
aﬀord education to acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an
adequate number of people can aﬀord education to acquire advanced skills. Consistent with
this and the above results, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), using data on international
tests for 50 countries, ﬁnd that both the share of students with basic skills and that of
top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are complementary each
other. The model provides a sectoral-shift-based explanation for their ﬁnding. The model’s
implications are also consistent with ﬁndings by Deininger and Olinto (2000) on relations
10Note, however, that the economy can converge to the second and third types of steady states too,
depending on details of the initial distribution. The best steady state is more likely to be reached as the
size of the very poor is smaller and the proportion of the non-poor to the poor is higher.
11The paper also examines the case where sectoral productivities are very low initially and grow over time.
When the modern sector’s productivity is very low, the best steady state does not exist and, even with a
good initial condition, the fraction of high-skill workers is constant (that of middle-skill workers rises) and
inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers too after some point) worsens. After
the productivity reaches a certain level, however, the fraction rises, the inequality falls, and the economy
converges to the best steady state. The dynamics may resemble experiences of many developed economies.
4
among initial inequality, education, and growth, Easterly (2001) on the importance of the
size of middle class in education and development, and La Porta and Shleifer (2008) on the
importance of educated managers in the expansion of the modern sector.12
In contrast, Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) argue that, land inequality negatively
aﬀects the implementation of public schooling and structural change, whereas capital in-
equality among the landless has no eﬀect and greater capital holdings by large landlords
have a positive eﬀect. They develop a model in which human capital is important in manu-
facturing, but not in agriculture, and its accumulation is determined by public expenditure
on education whose level must be agreed by all groups, landowners, capitalists, and work-
ers. While the latter two groups support public schooling, landowners oppose it, unless
their capital wealth becomes large enough. A threshold wealth level for public education in-
creases with land inequality. They show that the implication that land inequality adversely
aﬀects educational expenditures holds for U.S. state-level data in the period 1880–1940. The
present model and their model have diﬀerent implications on structural change, which could
be empirically distinguished, as discussed in the result section.
A direct policy implication is that large-scale wealth redistribution is very eﬀective in
changing the fate of an economy, but such policy would be very diﬃcult to be implemented in
normal times: successful East Asian economies executed large-scale land redistribution after
a major war. More realistically, the government can subsidize education, improve quality
of public schools (so that spending on costly private schools, study materials, or tutoring
ceases to be crucial to acquire skill), and develop ﬁnancial markets, all of which ease the
ﬁnancial burden of education to parents, and raise the modern sector’s productivity, which
raises wages of both sectors. Under present conditions of developing countries, these policies
cannot be performed on large enough scales to negate the importance of the initial condition
on the dynamics, but they can speed up convergence to the best steady state. Which level
of education should be prioritized in the subsidy policy depends on the initial condition.
The model abstracts from physical capital accumulation and population growth for
tractability and the focus on education and structural change. By contrast, Galor and
Moav (2004, 2006) develop models in which human capital accumulation starts only after
physical capital is accumulated enough in the course of development, and uniﬁed growth the-
ories surveyed in Galor (2005) model interactions among population growth, human capital
12Deininger and Olinto (2000) ﬁnd that growth is aﬀected negatively by initial land inequality and pos-
itively by mean years of schooling, which in turn is negatively aﬀected by the initial inequality. Easterly
(2001) ﬁnds that a greater size of middle class, measured as the share of income held by second through
fourth quintiles of the distribution, is associated with more education, higher income, and higher growth. La
Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd a large diﬀerence between formal and informal ﬁrms in the human capital of
managers and indicates that this drives other diﬀerences such as the quality of inputs and access to ﬁnance.
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accumulation, and technological change to explain the transition from Malthusian stagna-
tion to modern economic growth. The last part of the paper discusses how they would aﬀect
results. Consistent with their works, the full modernization of an economy would not be
possible while the level of physical capital is low or population growth is rapid.
Aside from these works, this paper is related to the theoretical literature on dual econ-
omy models, such as Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1998), Lucas (2004),
Wang and Xie (2004), Proto (2007), Yuki (2007, 2008), Vollrath (2009), and Gersback and
Siemens (2010).13 Banerjee and Newman (1998) examine implications of diﬀerences in tech-
nological and institutional conditions between rural traditional and urban modern sectors
for development and urbanization. Lucas (2004) examines rural-urban migration in a model
where urban workers allocate time between human capital accumulation and production.
Wang and Xie (2004) explore factors aﬀecting the activation of a modern industry using a
static two-sector model with non-homothetic preferences and uncompensated spillovers in
the IRS modern sector. Based on a three-sector (agrarian, manufacturing, and informal)
model, Proto (2007) analyzes how the initial number of unskilled landless workers, through
its eﬀect on their bargaining power against landlords and land rents, determines wealth and
human capital accumulations and development. Vollrath (2009) shows that the marginal
product of labor in the modern sector can be higher than in the traditional sector and such
allocation is welfare-maximizing based on a model in which individuals allocate time be-
tween market and non-market activities. Gersback and Siemens (2010) examine eﬀects of
land redistribution on education and development using a dynamic two-sector model.
The more closely related are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2007, 2008), which de-
velop dual economy models where, as in this paper, lumpy skill investment is constrained
by intergenerational transfers motivated by impure altruism and examine the relationship
between initial distribution and long-run outcome.14 Unlike the present paper, however, the
type of education (skill investment) is single, and either the traditional sector produces the
same good as the modern sector (Galor and Zeira) or only the sector produce goods for basic
consumption (Yuki). Their models cannot explore diﬀerent roles basic education and ad-
vanced education play in structural change and development. Further, they cannot capture
the shift of the production of goods for basic consumption from the traditional sector to
the modern sector with development, which is universally observed in real economy: in the
models of Yuki (2007, 2008), the traditional sector remains even in the best steady state.
13This paper is also related to the theoretical literature on structural change, which concerns the shift from
agriculture to manufacturing and services in the process of development, such as Laitner (2000), Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and Akbulut (2011).
14McDonald and Zhang (2012) examine the eﬀect of inequality on growth using a one-sector dynastic
model with bequests and human capital accumulation (tractable due to a focus on household production).
6
The paper is somewhat related to the empirical literature showing the existence of multi-
ple growth paths, such as van Paap, Franses, and Dijk (2005) and Owen, Videras, and Davis
(2009). Also, Alfo, Trovato, and Waldman (2008) ﬁnd that countries can be clustered into
groups with diﬀerent per capita GDP levels and with no sign of convergence across groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Since the model is a sequence of quasi-static economies
in which single generations make decisions, for ease of presentation, Section 2 presents and
analyzes the model without taking into account intergenerational linkages, then Section 3
considers the linkages. Section 4 analyzes the model and derives and discusses main results,
and Section 5 concludes. Appendix B contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
2 Model
Although the model is dynamic, it is a sequence of quasi-static economies in which single
generations make decisions. Thus, this section presents and analyzes the model without
taking into account intergenerational linkages, which are considered in the next section.15
2.1 Setup
Consider a deterministic, discrete-time, and small-open OLG economy inhabited by a con-
tinuum of two-period-lived individuals. Each adult has a single child and thus the population
is constant over time. The population of each generation is normalized to be 1.
Lifetime of an individual: In childhood, individual i receives a transfer bi from her
parent and spends it on assets ai and education to maximize future income. She must take
basic education (costs em), which corresponds to school and non-school education needed to
acquire essential skills taught at the primary and secondary education level in real economy,
to become a middle-skill worker, and advanced education (costs eh>em) to become a high-
skill worker.16 If she spends ej (j=h;m) on education, a
i= bi¡ej, and ai= bi if not. Since
no credit market exists for education investment, she cannot invest more than bi, i.e. ai¸0.
In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on basic con-
sumption ciB, non-basic consumption c
i
N , and a transfer to her single child (b
i)0. A unit of
non-basic consumption is a numeraire. Characteristics of the two types of consumption are
explained later. She maximizes the Cobb-Douglas utility subject to the budget constraint:
max U=(ciB)
°B(ciN)
°N [(bi)0]°b ; °i 2 (0; 1); °B+°N+°b=1; (1)
s:t: P ciB+c
i
N+(b
i)0=wi+(1+r)ai; (2)
15All variables are presented without time subscripts in this section.
16The cost of advanced education includes the cost of acquiring skills at the basic education level. In an
economy where quality of school education is low, a large part of the cost of basic or advanced education is
spending on non-school education such as private tutoring and education at cram school.
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where P is the relative price of basic consumption and wi is her gross wage. By solving the
maximization problem, the following consumption and transfer rules are obtained.
PciB=°B[w
i+(1+r)ai]; (3)
ciN=°N [w
i+(1+r)ai]; (4)
(bi)0=°b[wi+(1+r)ai]: (5)
Production: The small open economy (thus interest rate r is exogenous) is composed of
up to two sectors, the modern sector producing goodM and the traditional sector producing
good T . The modern sector, which utilizes advanced technology, employs high-skill and
middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector using primitive technology employs low-skill
workers.17 Production functions of the two sectors are:
YM=AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®; ®2(0; 1); (6)
YT =ATLl; (7)
where Lh, Lm, and Ll are numbers of high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers respec-
tively, and Ai (i=M;T ) is the exogenous productivity of sector i.
18
Characteristics of goods and consumption: Both good M and good T can be
used for basic consumption, while only good M can be used for non-basic consumption. In
other words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food, and shelter, can be produced
using either technology, while goods such as cars, electric appliances, and IT gadgets can be
produced using the advanced technology only. Speciﬁcally, a unit of basic consumption can
be fulﬁlled by the consumption of either a unit of good T or µ units of good M: The unit of
measurement of non-basic consumption is good M , so P · µ must hold.19
Assume that good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The assumption would be
better understood by associating the two sectors with sectors in real economy. The tradi-
tional sector produces consumption goods for basic needs using primitive technology, thus it
corresponds to the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture, and the household sector.
The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services (such as the retail of commodi-
17Ray (1998, pages 353¡54) notes that the traditional (modern) sector can have several meanings: agri-
cultural (industrial) sector, the sector employing old labor-intensive (new capital-intensive) technology, and
the sector with forms of organization based on family (capitalist principles). This paper’s use of the terms is
similar to the second one, reﬂecting its concern on the coexistence of sectors employing diﬀerent technologies
and types of workers in developing economies. Unlike the more typical last classiﬁcation, as detailed below,
the traditional sector in the paper corresponds to the urban informal sector, which is organized based on
capitalist principles, as well as traditional agricultural sector and the household sector in real economy.
18Because free international capital mobility is assumed, the production function of the modern sector
may be considered as a reduced form of the function that includes physical capital K as an input:
YM=gAM (Lh)¯(Lm)°(K)1¡¯ ¡° ; ¯; ° 2(0; 1):
When (6) is the reduced-form function, AM depends positively on gAM and negatively on r.
19Good M is used for education too: the education cost is that of purchasing a ﬁxed amount of the good.
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ties and meals) and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets, and accounts
for the majority of non-agricultural employment in many developing economies (OECD,
2009). Traditional agriculture is operated by family farms and supplies products mainly for
basic needs of domestic consumers.20 And, the household sector produces basic goods and
services mostly for self-consumption, whose size is large in developing countries. By con-
trast, the modern sector corresponds to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture,
which compete more directly with foreign producers (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).21
Determination of wages: Goods and labor markets are competitive, thus wages of
high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers are given by:
wh=®AM
³
Lm
Lh
´1¡®
; (8)
wm=(1¡®)AM
³
Lh
Lm
´®
; (9)
wl=PAT : (10)
For later use, denote wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers net of costs of education
by fwj=wj¡(1+r)ej (j=h;m), which are:fwh=fwh³LhLm´´®AM³LmLh 1´¡®¡(1+r)eh; (11)fwm= fwm³LhLm´´(1¡®)AM³LhLm ®´¡(1+r)em: (12)
Determination of P: When the relative price of good T is low, only good T of the
traditional sector is used for basic consumption and thus its market-clearing condition is:
PATLl=°B[whLh+wmLm+wlLl+(1+r)
R
aidi]; (13)
where the right-hand side is obtained by aggregating (3) over the adult population. Denote
aggregate intergenerational transfers by B. Then,
R
aidi = B¡ (ehLh+emLm) holds. By
plugging this expression, wl=PAT , and Ll=1¡(Lh+Lm) into (13) and solving for P ,
P =
°B
1¡°B
[wh¡(1+r)eh]Lh+[wm¡(1+r)em]Lm+(1+r)B
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] ; (14)
which is expressed as an increasing function of Lh, Lm, and B by using (8) and (9):
P =P (Lh;Lm;B)´ °B
1¡°B
AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®+(1+r)[B¡ehLh¡emLm]
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] : (15)
P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ must hold for P =P (Lh;Lm;B) to be true.
When Lh; Lm; and B are large, the demand (supply) for good T is high (low) enough
that P (Lh;Lm;B) > µ holds. Thus, good M too is used for basic consumption and P =µ.
20As in Yuki (2007), traditional agriculture may be introduced as a separate tradable sector operated by
low-skill farmers. The analysis would be much more complicated without aﬀecting most qualitative results.
21In real economy, there exist skill-intensive modern sectors supplying nontradables. However, in develop-
ing countries, most of skill-intensive nontradables are public services, health services, and education, where
market forces have limited roles, while sectors such as ﬁnance and consulting services are limited in size.
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Figure 1: Shapes of critical loci determining educational choices and wages
From these results, the low-skill wage equals:
wl=wl(Lh;Lm;B)´
½
P (Lh;Lm;B)AT when P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ
µAT when P (Lh;Lm;B)¸µ : (16)
2.2 Equilibrium educational choices and wages
Individuals are heterogenous in received transfer bi. Let Fh be the proportion of those who
can aﬀord eh to become a high-skill worker, and let Fm be the proportion of those who
cannot aﬀord eh but can aﬀord em to become a middle-skill worker (thus Fh + Fm · 1).
Since an individual can spend wealth on assets too, she spends on education only if it is
aﬀordable and proﬁtable: an individual with bi ¸ eh spends eh only if fwh¸maxffwm; wlg,
and one with bi ¸ em spends at least em only if fwm¸wl. Thus, Lh·Fh and Lh+Lm·Fh+Fm
must hold, but Lh = Fh and Lm = Fm may not. This section examines how Lh, Lm, and
wages are determined depending on key variables in the analysis, Fh, Fm, and B.
2.2.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
As can be seen from the above discussion, magnitude relations of fwh to fwm and of fwm to wl
at Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm are critical in determining Lh and Lm. For example, if fwh ¸ fwm
and fwm ¸ wl at Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm, Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm hold in equilibrium, i.e. if each
level of education is proﬁtable when all individuals take highest aﬀordable education, they
do take such education. Hence, combinations of Fh and Fm satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm )
and the combinations satisfying fwm( FhFm ) = wl(Fh;Fm;B) are crucial. Denote FhFm satisfyingfwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ) by (FhFm)hm and FhFm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=µAT (wl when P =µ) by (FhFm)ml;µ.
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Assumption 1 (Fh
Fm
)hm>(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ:
The assumption implies fwh = fwm > µAT at LhLm = (FhFm)hm; that is, the highest (lowest) net
middle-skill (high-skill) wage is strictly greater than the highest low-skill wage.
As for Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT (wl when P < µ), Lemma A1 of
Appendix A examines its existence and properties. In particular, the lemma shows that it
can be expressed as Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a decreasing function.
From (16), Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh , fwm( FhFm ) = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT aﬀects educational choices
when P (Fh;Fm;B) · µ; and FhFm =(FhFm)ml;µ , fwm( FhFm ) = µAT aﬀects the choices when
P (Fh;Fm;B)¸ µ. Hence, relative positions of P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ to these loci are important,
which is investigated in Lemma A2 of Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates shapes of the critical loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. (F
y
h(B) is the intersec-
tion of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh with
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, which decreases with B.) Since P (Fh;Fm;B)<
(>)µ below (above) P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ, Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh aﬀects educational choices below
P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ aﬀects the choices above the locus.
2.2.2 Educational choices and wages
The next proposition presents educational choices and thus sectoral choices of individuals.
Henceforth, individuals with bi ¸ eh, those with bi 2 [em; eh), and those with bi < em are
named the non-poor, the poor, and the extreme poor, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Educational choices) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are indiﬀerent between two education (fwh= fwm); the poor
take basic education, Lh=
(
Fh
Fm
)hm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)·Fh, Lm= Fh+Fm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
¸Fm, and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(ii) Otherwise, the non-poor take advanced education and thus Lh=Fh.
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), the poor take basic education, thus Lm=Fm and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, the poor are indiﬀerent
between basic education and no education (fwm = wl); Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh · Fm; and
Ll=1¡(1+Á(Fh;B))Fh; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, fwm=wl; Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh·Fm; and Ll=1¡f1+[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh.
Figure 2 illustrates how Lh and Lm are determined depending on Fh and Fm when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT .
22 As for Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, only portions of the loci that
are eﬀective (aﬀect the determination of Lh and Lm) are drawn.
22Loci are drawn for given B satisfying °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When B increases, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh shifts to
the left and F yh(B) falls. When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , P =µ always and the region Fh·F
y
h(B) disappears.
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Figure 2: Educational choices when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 1)
When Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor (those with b
i¸ eh) are abundant relative to the poor
(those with bi2 [em; eh)) and thus net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal.
Hence, some of the non-poor do not take advanced education (when Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)hm), while all
the poor take basic education, i.e. Lh<Fh and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
By contrast, when Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the net high-skill wage is strictly higher than the net
middle-skill wage and thus all the non-poor take advanced education, i.e. Lh=Fh. As for
the poor, when Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm) and thus the non-poor are not very scarce relative
to the poor, the net middle-skill wage is strictly higher than the low-skill wage and all of
them take basic education, i.e. Lm=Fm. When the non-poor are scarcer, i.e.
Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;
choices of the poor depend on Fh as well as
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, when Fh (thus Fm too) is
small, i.e. Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh (Á(¢) is a decreasing function), the size of the modern sector is
small. Hence, the demand for good T , its relative price, and the low-skill wage are low and
thus Lm = Fm holds. In contrast, when Fh is not small, the low-skill wage equals the net
middle-skill wage and some of the poor do not take basic education.23
Proposition 2 shows how net wages depend on Fh, Fm, and B.
Proposition 2 (Net wages) Suppose Fh>0.
23Speciﬁcally, when the non-poor are not abundant (Fh < F
y
h(B)), P < µ and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh < Fm,
while when they are large in number (Fh¸F yh(B)), P =µ and Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh<Fm.
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Figure 3: Net wages when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 2)
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm)(> wl), and wl = °B1¡°B gwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B1¡(Fh+Fm)
when Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT , wl=µAT otherwise.(ii) Otherwise,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), fwj=fwj( FhFm ) (j=h;m), wl=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when P (Fh;Fm;B)·
µ and wl=µAT otherwise, where fwh>fwm>wl.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh=fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) andfwm=wl= fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) (<µAT <fwh); otherwise, same as (a) when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, fwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ) and fwm=wl=µAT (<fwh).
Figure 3 illustrates magnitude relations of fwh, fwm, and wl and how the wages depend
on Fh, Fm, and B when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . In the ﬁgure, the locus P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ is
represented by a bold dashed line and P =µ on or above the line.
When Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are abundant relative to the poor (those with b
i 2
[em; eh)) and fwh= fwm= fwm((FhFm)hm) holds (the same wage level for any Fh and Fm in this
region). wl increases with Fh+Fm unless Fh+Fm is high enough that P = µ and wl= µAT
hold, because the non-poor and the poor receive the same level of net wage and thus the
demand for good T and P increase with Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
When Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor and thus fwh> fwm and
Lh = Fh. When they are not very scarce, i.e.
Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), and thus fwm > wl
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and Lm = Fm hold, fwh decreases and fwm increases with FhFm , while wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT
increases with Fh, Fm; and B, unless they are high enough that P = µ. When the non-
poor are scarcer, i.e. Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, the result depends on Fh and
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, if
Fh (and thus Fm) is small, i.e. Fm < Á(Fh;B)Fh, the result is same as the previous case,
whereas if Fh is higher, the demand for good T (and thus P ) is high enough that fwm=wl
holds. When Fh < F
y
h(B) and thus Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh (see Figure 2), fwh =fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)
and fwm =wl = fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1), that is, fwh decreases and fwm =wl increases with Fh and
B, while when Fh ¸ F yh(B) and thus P = µ and Lm = [(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh, fwm = wl = µAT andfwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ), that is, the wages are constant.
To summarize magnitude relations of wages, when Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm > wl; when
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and either
Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ or Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh> fwm>wl; and fwh> fwm=wl in
the remaining case.24
3 Dynamics
As noted earlier, the model can be considered as a sequence of quasi-static economies con-
nected by intergenerational transfers. Based on results of the previous section, this section
takes into account the intergenerational linkages.
3.1 Dynamics of individual transfers
Remember that the individual transfer rule is given by (now with time subscripts):
bit+1=°b[w
i
t+(1+r)a
i
t]; (17)
where wit and a
i
t are the wage and the asset of individual i born in period t¡1 and being
adult in period t, and bit+1 is the transfer to her child (whose adulthood is in period t+1).
Since ait depends on b
i
t, the dynamic equation linking the received transfer b
i
t to the
transfer given to the next generation bit+1 can be derived from the above equation. For a
high-skill worker, by substituting ait=b
i
t¡eh into (17) and using fwht=wht¡(1+r)eh,
bit+1=°bffwht+(1+r)bitg; (18)
where bit ¸ eh. °b(1+ r) < 1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given fwht, b¤(fwht) ´
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwht, exists. For a middle-skill worker, a similar equation with the net wage gwmt and
bit¸em holds. Finally, for a low-skill worker, since ait=bit,
bit+1=°bfwlt+(1+r)bitg: (19)
24A.2 of Appendix A examines how aggregate welfare, aggregate output, and sectoral composition depend
on Fh, Fm; and B: It is shown that increased access to education bringing higher net wages, i.e. higher
Fh+Fm when fwh=gwm, higher Fh and Fm when fwh>gwm>wl, and higher Fh when gwm=wl, raises welfare,
output, and the modern sector’s shares in production and basic consumption (when P =µ), while higher B
raises welfare, output when P <µ, and the consumption share, but lowers the production share when P <µ.
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The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on the time
evolution of wages, which in turn are determined by the dynamics of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
3.2 Aggregate dynamics
Given the initial distribution of wealth over the population, Fh0, Fm0, and B0 are determined
directly, while levels of the aggregate variables in subsequent periods are determined by the
dynamics of the distribution of transfers. However, detailed information on the distributional
dynamics is not required to obtain main implications of the model. What is needed is
information on directions of motion of the aggregate variables, which is examined in this
subsection. For exposition, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt and those of Bt are examined
separately ﬁxing the other variable(s) ﬁrst, then their interactions are taken into account.
3.2.1 Dynamics of Fht and Fmt
The dynamics of Fht and Fmt are determined by the dynamics of individual transfers. As for
the dynamics of Fht, if children of some middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced
education through wealth accumulation, Fht+1>Fht holds.
25 This takes places iﬀ there exist
lineages satisfying bit<eh and b
i
t+1¸eh. From (18) with fwht replaced by gwmt, the following
condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b¤(gwmt) = °b
1¡°b(1+r)gwmt >eh: (20)
If the equation holds, Fht+1¸Fht, otherwise, Fht+1=Fht. (In the former case, Fht+1=Fht
is possible depending on the distribution of transfers, but, if the inequality holds for certain
periods, Fht does increase eventually.)
Regarding levels of b¤(fwht) and b¤(gwmt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 2 b¤(fwh((FhFm)hm)) = b¤(fwm((FhFm)hm)) = °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)>eh:
The assumption implies that oﬀspring of high-skill workers can aﬀord advanced education
even when their wage is lowest and thus Fht never decreases. Assume that the initial
distribution of wealth is such that Fh0>0. Then, Fht>0 for any t>0.
As for the dynamics of Fmt, since Fht+1 ¸ Fht is true, if b¤(wlt) > em, Fht+1+Fmt+1 ¸
Fht+Fmt; if b
¤(gwmt)<em; Fht+1=Fht and Fmt+1·Fmt; otherwise, Fht+1+Fmt+1=Fht+Fmt.
Hence, directions of motion of Fht and Fmt can be known from magnitude relations of
b¤(gwmt) to eh and em and of b¤(wlt) to em, except when b¤(gwmt)>eh and b¤(wlt)>em, in which
the direction of motion of Fmt is ambiguous (Fht+1¸Fht and Fht+1+Fmt+1¸Fht+Fmt).
Regarding the value of b¤(wlt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 3 °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh):
25From Assumption 3 below, children of low-skill workers never become accessible to advanced education.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B
The assumption states that children of some low-skill workers can aﬀord basic education but
not advanced education when their wage is highest. The two assumptions are maintained
until Section 4.3 where eﬀects of productivity growth are examined.
From these assumptions and Proposition 2, there exist combinations of Fh and Fm satis-
fying b¤(fwm)=eh, those satisfying b¤(fwm)=em, and those satisfying b¤(wl)=em (see Figure
4). b¤(fwm) =eh equals a FhFm 2((FhFm)ml;µ; (FhFm)hm) such that °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm )=eh. b¤(fwm) =em
equals a Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ such that
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = em for Fm < Á(F [h(B);B)F [h(B) and
equals Fh=F
[
h(B) for higher Fm; where F
[
h(B) (a decreasing function) denotes Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B))=em. Finally, b¤(wl)=em equals:
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm; Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em¡ °B1¡°B (1+r)B
°B
1¡°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (21)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =em; (22)
and for lower Fh
Fm
, Fh=F
[
h(B): (23)
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B by placing the three critical
loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. In the ﬁgure, b
¤(fwm)>(<)eh at the left (right) side of b¤(fwm)=eh
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(the bold solid line), b¤(fwm)>(<)em above (below) b¤(fwm)=em (the bold dashed line), and
b¤(wl)> (<)em above (below) b¤(wl) = em (the bold dotted line). Positions of Fht and Fmt
relative to the three loci determine directions of motion of the two variables. In regions with
horizontal arrows only, only Fmt changes: for example, in the region below b
¤(fwm) = em,
b¤(fwm)<em and thus Fmt decreases. Arrows with slope ¡1 are present in the region above
b¤(fwm) = eh and on or below b¤(wl) = em, because b¤(fwm) > eh and b¤(wl) · em and thus
Fht increases with Fht+Fmt constant. In the region above b
¤(wl) = em and b¤(fwm) = eh
(thus b¤(wl)>em and b¤(fwm)>eh) and below Fh+Fm=1, both arrows with slope ¡1 and
horizontal arrows are drawn, since Fht and Fht+Fmt increase but the direction of motion
of Fmt is ambiguous (Fht and Fmt move in the direction between the two arrows). Finally,
both Fht and Fmt are constant and thus no arrows are present in the region on or below
b¤(fwm)=eh and b¤(wl)=em and on or above b¤(fwm)=em.
Note that positions of b¤(fwm)= em and b¤(wl)= em as well as those of P (Fh;Fm;B)= µ
and Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh change with B. Thus, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt must be examined
together with those of Bt. Before examining the joint dynamics, the dynamic equation of
Bt is derived and the direction of motion of Bt for given Fht and Fmt is examined next.
3.2.2 Dynamics of aggregate transfers
The dynamic equation of aggregate transfers is obtained by aggregating the dynamic equa-
tions for individual transfers over the population:
Bt+1=°b ffwhtLht+gwmtLmt+wlt(1¡Lht¡Lmt)+(1+r)Btg ; (24)
where the expression inside the curly bracket is aggregate income net of education costs,
which can be expressed as a function of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
A.3 of Appendix A analyzes the equation. It is shown that the equation diﬀers depending
on Fht and Fmt, and for given Fht and Fmt, the direction of motion of Bt is determined by
the magnitude relation of Bt to the ﬁxed point: Bt increases (decreases) when it is smaller
(greater) than the value at the ﬁxed point. For later use, notations of the ﬁxed points are:bB¤(Fht+Fmt) when FhtFmt ¸(FhFm)hm; B¤(Fht;Fmt) when FhtFmt 2(minf[Á(Fht;Bt)]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg; (FhFm)hm),
and B
¤
(Fht) for lower
Fht
Fmt
, all of which are increasing functions.
3.3 Joint dynamics of the aggregate variables
As mentioned earlier, as Bt changes over time, positions of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh,
b¤(fwm) = em, and b¤(wl) = em in Figure 4 change and thus directions of motion of Fht and
Fmt could be aﬀected. Thus, analyzing the joint dynamics are generally diﬃcult.
However, it turns out that under the following weak assumption on B0, characteristics of
17
the dynamics are mostly determined by relative positions of Fht and Fmt to these loci when
aggregate transfers are at ﬁxed point levels (and the relative positions to the remaining loci).
Assumption 4 B0· bB¤(Fh0+Fm0) for Fh0Fm0 ¸(FhFm)hm; B0·B¤(Fh0;Fm0) for Fh0Fm0 2(minf[Á(Fh0;B0)]¡1;
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µg; (FhFm)hm), and B0·B
¤
(Fh0) for lower
Fh0
Fm0
.
The assumption states that the initial level of aggregate transfers is less than the ﬁxed point
level at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0), that is, initial wealth accumulation is not very large.
P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))=µ equals, from (15) and (34):
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)
AT [1¡(Fh+Fm)] =µ: (25)
As for Fm = Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh, Lemma A3 of Appendix A shows that Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)) is de-
creasing in Fh. b
¤(fwm) = em equals a FhFm < (FhFm)ml;µ such that °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = em
for Fm < Á(F
[
h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h and Fh = F
[
h for higher Fm, where F
[
h denotes Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B¤(Fh)))=em. Finally, b¤(wl)=em equals, from (21) and (30):
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm; Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (26)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT =em; (27)
and for lower Fh
Fm
, Fh=F
[
h: (28)
Hence, shapes of these loci are similar to the case of constant B; and their positions on
the (Fh;Fm) plane can be illustrated by a ﬁgure similar to Figure 4.
4 Main Results
4.1 Characteristics of steady states
First, characteristics of steady states are investigated. The next proposition shows that there
exist four types of steady states. (F yh denotes Fh satisfying [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 = (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ.)
Proposition 3 (Steady states) There exist the following four types of steady states.26
[SS 1] (Fh;Fm;B) = (1;0; bB¤(1)): Lh and Lm satisfy LhLm = (FhFm)hm and Lh+Lm=1 (Ll =0),
P =µ; and fwh= fwm= fwm((FhFm)hm).
[SS 2] Fh = Lh satisﬁes Fh>F
[
h and b
¤(fwm)·eh, Fh1¡Fh ·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, Fm = 1¡Fh.
a: If Fh
1¡Fh ·(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; B = B
¤
(Fh); Lm=maxfÁ(Fh; B¤(Fh));[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh,P =P (Fh;Lm;B
¤
(Fh))<
µ for Fh<F
y
h and P = µ for higher Fh, and fwh=fwh(minf[Á(Fh; B¤(Fh))]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg)>fwm=wl=PAT .
26Actually, there exists another type of steady states satisfying Fh=F [h, Fm>Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh; and B =
B
¤
(Fh), but this cannot be reached out of the steady states and thus is not considered.
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Figure 5: Steady states (Proposition 3)
b: Otherwise; B=B¤(Fh;Fm), Lm=Fm = 1¡Fh, P =µ, and fwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm= fwm(FhFm).
[SS 3] Fh satisﬁes b
¤(wl)·em,Fh·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em and (Fm;B) = (0;
bB¤(Fh)).
Lh and Lm satisfy
Lh
Lm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm = Fh; P =
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)Fh
AT (1¡Fh) <µ, andfwh= fwm= fwm((FhFm)hm)>wl=PAT .
[SS 4] Fh and Fm satisfy
Fh
Fm
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii and P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em, and B = B
¤(Fh;Fm): Lh = Fh, Lm = Fm; P = P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm)) < µ; andfwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm= fwm(FhFm)>wl=PAT .
Figure 5 illustrates four types of steady states, which diﬀer in proportions of the poor
and the extreme poor, wage inequality, the size of the traditional sector, etc. In SS 1, all
individuals are non-poor, i.e. they have enough wealth to take advanced education (Fh=1),
net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal (fwh = fwm), and the traditional
sector does not exist (thus Ll = 0 and P = µ). In SS 2, the extreme poor do not exist, i.e.
everyone can access at least basic education (Fh+Fm=1), but inequality between high-skill
workers and others exists (fwh > fwm). When Fh1¡Fh · (FhFm)ml;µ, net wages of middle-skill and
low-skill workers are equal (fwm = wl) and thus some do not take basic education (Ll > 0)
and ﬁnd jobs in the traditional sector, while when Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; everyone takes at least
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basic education (Ll=0) and works in the modern sector. In SS 3, there are no poor people
(Fm = 0) and fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm) holds as in SS 1, but the extreme poor exist (Fh < 1)
and become low-skill workers, inequality between low-skill workers and others is high, and
only the traditional sector supplies goods for basic consumption (thus P <µ). In SS 4, both
the poor and the extreme poor exist, there are inequalities among the three types of workers
(fwh>fwm>wl), and the traditional sector is the sole supplier of goods for basic consumption.
SS 1 has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty, low wage inequality (wages
net of education costs are equal), high relative price of basic consumption (e.g. the relative
price of a meal to a cell phone is higher than in developing nations), and no traditional sector
(thus goods for basic consumption are supplied by the modern sector). Other types of steady
states share the contrasting features (except no traditional sector when Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of
SS 2), but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and wage inequality. In SS 2, extreme poverty
does not exist but many cannot access education to acquire advanced skills, thus wage
inequality between high-skill and other workers is high, while inequality between middle-
skill and low-skill workers is low, features of many middle-income economies. In SS 3, those
who can aﬀord basic education can access advanced education as well, but many cannot
aﬀord even basic education, hence wage inequality between low-skill workers and others is
high, while net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal as in SS 1. And, in
SS 4, as observed in poorest economies, many cannot aﬀord basic or advanced education, and
typically inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers as well as the one between
high-skill and middle-skill workers are high.
Proposition A3 of Appendix A examines welfare, output, and sectoral composition of the
steady states. It conﬁrms that SS 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income, average
utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but if they
are to be ranked, SS 2 is the second best, SS 3 follows, and SS 4 is the worst. In each type
of steady states, the welfare and output measures increase with the proportion(s) of those
accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh in SS 2 and SS 3, and Fh and
Fm in SS 4 (see Figure 5). Somewhat consistent with a ﬁnding by La Porta and Shleifer
(2008), in SS 2 and SS 4, the production share of the traditional sector increases with Fh
Fm
when Fh
Fm
is relatively low.27
27La Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in the average GDP share of the informal sector
between countries in the bottom quartile of the income distribution and in the second quartile is very small,
and in one measure, the latter group’s share is a little higher, although the employment share is much lower.
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Figure 6: Initial conditions and steady states (Proposition A4)
4.2 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
From a given initial distribution of wealth, to which type of steady states does the economy
converge in the long run? Proposition A4 of Appendix A analyzes the issue in detail.
Figure 6 presents illustrative trajectories of the dynamics based on the proposition. The
position of (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) relative to b
¤(fwm)= eh essentially determines whether the
economy can converge to SS 1 or not. When Fh0
Fm0
·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi (the region on or below
b¤(fwm)= eh), SS 1 cannot be reached except rare possibilities described in the proposition.
Because high-skill workers are scarce relative to middle-skill workers, the middle-skill wage is
not high enough for children of middle-skill workers to access advanced education, i.e. Fht is
constant. If Fh0 and Fm0 are relatively high, the low-skill wage is high enough that b
¤(wl)>em
holds initially, descendants of low-skill workers become accessible to basic education over
time, i.e. Fmt increases, and the economy converges to SS 2. By contrast, if b
¤(wl) · em
holds initially, Fmt non-increases (Fmt decreases while
Fht
Fmt
is low enough that b¤(fwm)<em
is satisﬁed), and the economy converges to SS 4.
When Fh0
Fm0
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, the middle-skill wage is high enough that descendants of
middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced education over time, i.e. Fht increases.
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Unless Fh0
Fm0
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em, in which case Fht+Fmt is constant and the ﬁnal state
is SS 3, the economy could converge to SS 1 through rises in Fht
Fmt
and Fht (thus inequality
between high-skill workers and others falls), although it could converge to SS 2 and SS 3 too
depending on details of the initial distribution. SS 1 is more likely to be reached when wages
of low-skill and middle-skill wages are high relative to the high-skill wage, i.e. when Fh0,
Fm0, and
Fh0
Fm0
are relatively high.
The result suggests that, for the best long-run outcome to be realized, the initial distri-
bution of wealth must be such that the extreme poor (those who cannot aﬀord education to
acquire basic skills) are not large in number and the non-poor (those who can aﬀord educa-
tion to acquire advanced skills) must be suﬃcient relative to the poor. Both conditions seem
to have held in a small number of East Asian economies evolving into developed economies,
largely because of large-scale land redistribution and eﬀective public school system. As in
the model economy converging to SS 1, inequality between workers with advanced skills and
others fell over time in the course of development in these economies (Wood, 1994).
If the initial size of the extreme poor is large, i.e. Fh0 +Fm0 is low, which would be true
for poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and
others persist, because good T is cheap and thus low-skill workers with meager earnings
cannot escape from misery (SS 3 and SS 4). If the size of the extreme poor is not large but
the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor, i.e. Fh0 + Fm0 is not low but
Fh0
Fm0
is low, which
would be the case for typical developing nations with modest growth, low-skill workers are
better-paid, thus the fraction of middle-skill workers and the share of the modern sector
rise and inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over time.28 However,
since children of middle-skill workers have diﬃculty in ”moving up” due to low middle-skill
wage, inequality between these workers and high-skill workers worsens over time. And, the
lack of adequate number of high-skill workers typically restrains the growth of the modern
sector and thus the traditional sector continues to supply goods for basic consumption (SS 2).
These are what typical developing economies have experienced, as described at the beginning
of the introduction. Note that average years of schooling did increase greatly in most of these
economies, but skill accumulation, especially the growth of the share of high-skill individuals,
seems to be modest, judging from lingering enormous gaps in cognitive skills with developed
economies (see footnote 3 in the introduction). Quality of public schools remains low (and
even declined in many economies) and thus people have to rely on costly private schools,
study materials, and tutoring to become high-skill workers.
The main implication is that, for the full modernization of an economy, the initial dis-
28To be precise, if the size of the non-poor is very small, i.e. Fh0<F [h, this description does not apply. As
is clear from Figure 6, Fmt falls over time and the long-run state becomes same as the case of low Fh0+Fm0.
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tribution of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people
can aﬀord education to acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that
an adequate number of people can aﬀord education to acquire advanced skills. Consistent
with this and the above results, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), using data on interna-
tional student achievement tests for 50 countries, ﬁnd that both the share of students with
basic skills and that of top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that
are complementary each other. The model provides a sectoral-shift-based explanation for
their ﬁnding. The model’s implications are also consistent with ﬁndings by Deininger and
Olinto (2000) on relations among initial inequality, education, and growth, Easterly (2001)
on the importance of the size of middle class in education and development, and La Porta
and Shleifer (2008) on the importance of educated managers in the expansion of the modern
sector (see footnote 12 in the introduction for details).
In contrast, Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) argue that, land inequality negatively
aﬀects the implementation of public schooling and structural change, whereas capital in-
equality among the landless has no eﬀect and greater capital holdings by large landlords
have a positive eﬀect. They develop a model in which human capital is important in manu-
facturing, but not in agriculture, and its accumulation is determined by public expenditure
on education whose level must be agreed by all groups, landowners, capitalists, and work-
ers. While the latter two groups support public schooling, landowners oppose it, unless their
capital wealth becomes large enough. A threshold wealth level for public education increases
with land inequality. They show that the implication that land inequality adversely aﬀects
educational expenditures holds for U.S. state-level data in the period 1880–1940. Hippe
and Baten (2012) also ﬁnd a negative relationship between land inequality and numeracy
development for European regions in the 19th and the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century.
In the present model, distributions of land and capital have similar eﬀects on results,
while they have distinct eﬀects in Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009). Further, dimensions of
the distributions important for structural change are diﬀerent: in this model, large shares
in both the bottom and the middle of wealth distribution are critical, whereas, a low share
of land and a large share of capital held by large landowners are important in their model.
If data on both land and capital holdings are available, the diﬀerent implications can be
empirically distinguished. If only data on one of them or combined holdings are available,
the implications could be partially tested by looking at whether the particular dimensions of
the distributions have important eﬀects, and whether the strength of the eﬀects are diﬀerent
depending on the importance of agriculture in an economy.
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Figure 7: Case of low AM , i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)·eh
4.3 Productivity growth
So far, productivity levels of the two sectors, AM and AT , are assumed to be time-invariant.
In real economy, they change over time, in particular, AM usually grows persistently due to
technological growth. What happens to the dynamics and steady states when AM increases
over time? From the equations for the critical loci in Section 3, an increase in AM shifts
Fh
Fm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm upward and shifts the other loci except Fm = Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh (the eﬀect is
ambiguous) downward on the (Fm;Fh) plane with the relative positions unchanged (see Figure
6). Hence, over time, the economy becomes more likely to converge to SS 1 and, as observed
in developed nations, the relative number of high-skill workers to middle-skill workers in the
best steady state rises. This is because the growth of AM raises formal-sector wages directly
and the low-skill wage indirectly through increased demand for good T. With the continuous
productivity growth, the economy ultimately converges to the best steady state from any
initial condition, but the speed of convergence depends critically on the initial condition.
Hence, qualitative results of the constant AM case continue to hold approximately.
Another assumption maintained until now is Assumption 2, °b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm) > eh,
which states that AM is high enough that oﬀspring of high-skill (middle-skill) workers can
aﬀord advanced education at fwh = fwm; i.e. when their wage is lowest (highest). It would
be plausible today but may not in the past, considering the historical growth of AM . If
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)·eh holds but AM is not extremely low, for given AM , the phase diagram
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Figure 8: Case of low AT, i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT ·em
looks like Figure 7.29 Unlike Figure 6, b¤(fwh)=eh, not b¤(fwm)=eh; exists below FhFm =(FhFm)hm
and above b¤(fwm)= em. Since Fht decreases above b¤(fwh)= eh; Fh=Fm=1 is not a steady
state. There exist two types of steady states similar to SS 2 and SS 4 of the original economy,
where the convergence to the former type is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are higher.
The related assumption on AT is Assumption 3,
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh). The productivity
of the traditional sector is less aﬀected by the advancement of science and technology, but
it would grow slowly in real economy, thus the assumption may not hold far in the past
or in the future. When °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT · em, children of low-skill workers cannot access basic
education even at P =µ and Fmt non-increases. As illustrated in Figure 8, unlike the original
economy, b¤(wl) = em does not exist, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located below b
¤(fwm) = em, and the
dividing locus between P <µ and P =µ is located at the lower position on the (Fm;Fh) plane.
For given AT ; two kinds of steady states exist, one ”combining” SS 1 and SS 3 and the other
”combining” SS 2 and SS 4, and if b¤(fwm)>eh at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0); the economy converges
to the former type, and to the latter one otherwise. Convergence to Fh=Fm=1 is impossible
unless the economy starts without the extreme poor. By contrast, when °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT >eh;
i.e. even children of low-skill workers can access advanced education at P = µ, the result is
somewhat similar to the original economy, but the economy is more (less) likely to converge
29When AM is extremely low, b¤(fwh)= eh is located below b¤(gwm)= em, and the economy converges to
Fh=Fm = 0 from any initial distribution, which is clearly not realistic in modern times.
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to SS 1 (SS 2).30 Unlike AM ; the growth of AT does not make SS 1 the unique steady state
since the positive eﬀect on the low-skill wage is canceled out by lower P when P <µ.31
These results can be used to examine the dynamics from the far past when the sectoral
productivities grow over time. As for an economy whose initial AM does not satisfy Assump-
tion 2 but initial AT satisﬁes Assumption 3, the dynamics are illustrated by Figure 7 at ﬁrst
and by Figure 6 after some point.32 If Fh0 and Fm0 are relatively high, at ﬁrst, Fmt; but not
Fht, rises and the inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers
too when P =µ) enlarges over time, but after AM becomes high enough for Assumption 2 to
hold, Fht rises, the inequality shrinks, and the economy converges to the best steady state.
The dynamics may resemble historical experiences of many developed economies.
4.4 Policy implications
The paper stresses the importance of the initial distribution of wealth in determining human
capital accumulation and structural change of an economy, which is supported by empirical
studies cited in Section 4.2. A straightforward policy implication is that large-scale wealth
redistribution is very eﬀective in changing the fate of an economy. However, it would be very
diﬃcult to implement such redistribution in normal times: successful East Asian economies
carried out large-scale land redistribution after a major war. Then, what can be done to
put an economy on a faster track to the best steady state, SS 1?
One thing that can be done is reducing the ﬁnancial burden of education to parents.
While people must self-ﬁnance education costs in the model, many can borrow a part of
costs in real economy, suggesting that the development of ﬁnancial markets might be im-
portant. Indeed, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2007) show empirically that ﬁnancial
development boosts incomes of the poor through increased aggregate growth and reduced
income inequality. However, making education loans widely available to the poor would be
diﬃcult because of the nature of educational investment: reaping fruits of the investment
takes many years. A more eﬀective way to ease the burden would be governmental subsidy
to education, including public provision of education. But, under tight budget, providing
generous subsidies to too many students (e.g. the introduction of tuition-free education
30In this case, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located above b¤(gwm) = eh; b¤(wl) = eh exists and is located between
b¤(wl)= em and the dividing locus between P <µ and P = µ; and b¤(wl)= eh and b¤(gwm)= eh intersect on
Fm = Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh (see Figure 6). If the initial economy is located above b¤(wl) = eh; it converges to
Steady state 1 for certain, otherwise, the dynamics are qualitatively same as the original economy.
31The growth of AT shifts FhFm =(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and the dividing locus between P <µ and P =µ upward but does
not change the loci aﬀecting the dynamics of Fht and Fmt such as b¤(wl)=em:
32As mentioned before, the growth of AM shifts FhFm =(
Fh
Fm
)hm and b¤(fwh)=eh upward and the remaining
loci except Fm=Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh (the eﬀect is ambiguous) downward. The growth of AT ; by contrast, shifts
Fh
Fm
= (FhFm)ml;µ and the dividing locus between P < µ and P = µ upward. If AM grows faster than AT ; a
realistic assumption, the two loci shift downward, so the transition from Figure 7 to Figure 6 takes place.
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in poor countries) worsens quality of education, as has occurred in many countries. The
government must ﬁnd ways to subsidize education eﬀectively. The analysis in Section 4.2
indicates that eﬀective subsidy depends on an economy’s initial condition. If the size of the
extreme poor is not large but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor and thus the econ-
omy is on a track to SS 2, subsidizing advanced education should be given priority, which
lowers eh and shifts b
¤(fwm) = eh downward (see Figure 6). If an economy is approaching
SS 3, subsidizing basic education (so that b¤(wl)=em is lowered) is the priority, while if it is
in SS 4, both levels of education should be assisted. Improving quality of public schools is
also important in easing the ﬁnancial burden, because it is hard to become high-skill workers
without spending on costly private schools, study materials, and tutoring in many countries.
Increasing wages by boosting the productivity of the modern sector is also worthwhile.
According to the analysis in Section 4.3, when the productivity is very high, wages of both
sectors become high enough that quick convergence to SS 1 is possible from any initial
condition. However, raising the productivity greatly in a short time would not be realis-
tic, because studies point out not only diﬃculties in adopting advanced technology from
abroad (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) but also enormous cross-country productivity gaps
not explained by technology gaps, which depend on factors such as diﬀerences in quality
of economic and political institutions (Weil, 2013, Chapter 10). While raising the sector’s
productivity enables convergence to the best steady state faster, the initial condition would
largely direct the dynamics. Raising the productivity of the traditional sector, by contrast,
is not very eﬀective, because the analysis in Section 4.3 suggests that the growth of AT
does not aﬀect the speed of convergence to SS 1 (unless the initial condition is very good).
Further, raising AT would be much harder than raising AM : it is much less aﬀected by
technological progress and the productivity of traditional agriculture is largely determined
by climate and geographical conditions of an economy.
In sum, the government can speed up convergence to the best steady state by subsidizing
appropriate education, developing ﬁnancial markets, and raising the modern sector’s pro-
ductivity, although the initial condition would largely determine the dynamics. Which level
of education should be prioritized in the subsidy policy depends on the initial condition.
4.5 Discussions
The model abstracts from physical capital accumulation and population growth for tractabil-
ity and the focus on education and structural change. This subsection discusses how they
would aﬀect results. The main implication is that the full modernization of an economy
would not be possible while the level of physical capital is low or population growth is rapid.
4.5.1 Role of physical capital accumulation
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As noted in footnote 18 of Section 2, the modern sector’s production function can be consid-
ered as a reduced form of the function that includes physical capital as an additional input,
in which case the sector’s productivity AM depends negatively on r. Physical capital is not
considered explicitly since its accumulation does not aﬀect results in a small open economy.
When the capital market is not perfectly open, the accumulation aﬀects human capital
accumulation and structural change. As physical capital is accumulated over time, r falls
and thus AM rises. A rise in AM has positive eﬀects on wages of modern-sector workers and,
when P < µ, the wage of traditional-sector workers. A fall in r also has direct negative eﬀects
on wealth accumulation of many individuals. If the former eﬀects through AM dominate the
latter ones, the dynamics would be similar to the growing AM case analyzed in Section 4.3.
In particular, when the level of physical capital is low, the dynamics would be illustrated
by a diagram similar to the one for the low AM case, Figure 7, where the best steady state
(Fh=Fm=1) does not exist. Because the relative productivity of the modern sector is low,
the sector cannot generate suﬃcient numbers of jobs for educated workers and typically the
traditional sector absorbs uneducated workers. Only after physical capital is accumulated
enough, a phase diagram would look like the original one, Figure 6.
In sum, when the capital market is not perfectly open, physical capital accumulation
plays a critical role in human capital accumulation and structural change. In particular,
the best steady state of no traditional sector and high human capital cannot be realized
unless physical capital is accumulated enough. Relatedly, Galor and Moav (2004, 2006)
develop models in which human capital accumulation starts only after physical capital is
accumulated enough in the course of development.
4.5.2 Role of population growth
As far as economic growth in the very long run, that is, the transition from Malthusian
stagnation to modern economic growth, is concerned, population growth is a crucial factor.
Uniﬁed growth theories (Galor, 2005) model interactions among population growth, human
capital accumulation, and technological change to explain such transition.33 Although this
paper’s concern is on current situations of developing economies, it would be important to
see how results are aﬀected by population growth, considering that population growth has
changed over time in modern times (for example, it has been slowing down recently).
As population growth becomes higher, resources parents leave to their children are di-
luted. Such dilution would be captured by a fall in °b in the equation describing intergen-
erational transfers of wealth. With less inherited wealth, less children can aﬀord education.
Thus, b¤(fwm)=eh shifts to the right (b¤(fwm)=em and b¤( ewl)=em shift to the left) in Figure
33Rahman (2013) develops a model with endogenous directed technical change and demography.
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6, and the best steady state becomes more diﬃcult to be reached. If population growth is
rapid and thus °b is very low, the dynamics could be illustrated by a diagram similar to the
one for the low AM case, Figure 7, where the best steady state does not exist. Hence, the
full modernization of an economy may not be possible while population growth is rapid.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model and examines how the long-run outcome
of an economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral productivity. It is
shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial distribution must be
such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can take education to acquire
basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number of people
can access education for advanced skills. Both conditions seem to have held in successful
East Asian nations, where, as in the model economy undergoing such transformation, the
fraction of workers with advanced skills rose greatly and inequalities between these workers
and others fell over time. In contrast, if the former holds but the latter does not, which would
be the case for many nations falling into ”middle income trap”, consistent with facts, the
fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector rise, but inequality
between workers with advanced skills and with basic skills worsens and the traditional sector
remains for long periods. If the former condition does not hold, which would be true for
poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between workers without basic
skills and others persist for very long periods. Consistently, Hanushek and Woessmann
(2009) ﬁnd that both the share of students with basic skills and that of top performance
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are complementary each other.
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Appendix A: Supplementary analysis
A.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
This section examines critical equations determining educational choices and wages, in par-
ticular, Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh and P (Fh;Fm;B)=
µ. Remember that (Fh
Fm
)hm is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ), which exists and is unique
since fwh (fwm) decreases (increases) with FhFm and fwh > (<)fwm at FhFm = 0(=+1) from (11)
and (12), and (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwm( FhFm )=µAT (wl when P =µ).
Lemma A1 shows the existence of Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and describes its shape and its relation with (
Fh
Fm
)hm and (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. (When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT ; P (Fh;Fm;B)>µ from (15) and thus P =µ:)
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Figure 9: Lemma A1
Lemma A1 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . Then, positive Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =
P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exists and is expressed as Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a function satis-
fying limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) ´
·
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)(
°B
1¡°B B+em)¸
1
®
. When Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)hm, Á(¢) is a decreas-
ing function of its arguments, and, for given B, there exists a unique Fh > 0 satisfying
[Á(Fh;B)]
¡1=(Fh
Fm
)hm, denoted F
z
h(B), and the one satisfying [Á(Fh;B)]
¡1=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, denoted
F yh(B), where F
z
h(¢) and F yh(¢) are decreasing functions and F zh(B)>F yh(B).
Figure 9 illustrates Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh (fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT ), FhFm =(FhFm)hm, and FhFm =
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ on the (Fm; Fh) plane. F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) are unique intersections of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh
with Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, respectively. As Fh ! 0; Fm satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh
approaches 0 (since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B) <1). FhFm = 1Á(Fh;B) increases with Fh, thus Fm
increases with Fh on the curve for low
Fh
Fm
, but the relationship turns negative for high Fh
Fm
.
As B increases, Á(Fh;B) decreases, thus the curve shifts leftward and F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) fall.
Lemma A2 describes the shape of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ and its relation with Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Lemma A2 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When
Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm] ([Á(0)]
¡1 is the small-
est Fh
Fm
satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;0)Fh), P (Fh;Fm;B) is an increasing function of its arguments.
Given B, for any Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm], Fh and Fm satisfying P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ exist and are
unique, and for Fh
Fm
>(<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh when P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ.
A.2 Eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on welfare, output, and sectoral
composition
32
This section examines eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on aggregate income net of education costs
(NI ´ fwhLh+ fwmLm+wl(1¡Lh¡Lm)+(1+ r)B), average utility, aggregate output (Y =
YM+PYT ), the share of the modern sector in production (
YM
Y
), and the sector’s share in
basic consumption when P = µ (CBM
PCB
), where CBM denotes the amount of good M used for
basic consumption. Proofs of the following two propositions are provided in Appendix D
posted on the author’s website (http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html).
Proposition A1 (Net aggregate income and average utility) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, NI and average utility increase with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii) Otherwise,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), they increase with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, they increase with Fh
and B; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, they increase with Fh and B.
Both net aggregate income and average utility increase with B and the proportion(s) of
individuals accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh+Fm when fwh= fwm,
Fh and Fm when fwh> fwm>wl, and Fh when fwm=wl. As for NI and average utility when
P =µ, this is because the negative eﬀect through fwh or fwm (except when fwh= fwm>wl=µAT
or fwh> fwm=wl= µAT ) is dominated by positive eﬀects through other wages (except whenfwh= fwm>wl = µAT ), proportions of workers with higher net wages, and B. When P < µ,
increases in these variables raise P and thus have a negative eﬀect on average utility, but
the positive eﬀect through net aggregate income dominates.
Proposition A2 (Aggregate output and sectoral composition) Suppose Fh>0.
(i)When Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, if Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i , Y increases with Fh+Fm and B;
and YM
Y
increases with Fh+Fm
B
; otherwise, they increase with Fh+Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases
with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii)When Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ (possible only when °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT ),
Y increases with Fh; Fm; and B; and
YM
Y
increases with Fh and Fm and decreases with
B; otherwise, they increase with Fh and Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT and Fh <F
y
h(B), if Fm ¸ Á(Fh;B)Fh, Y increases with Fh
and B; and YM
Y
decreases with B (depends on Fh too); otherwise, same as (a) when
P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, Y and YM
Y
increase with Fh; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh and B.
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When P < µ, aggregate output increases with B and the proportion(s) of individuals
accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, as NI and average utility do. In the
case of Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, this is because the increased proportion(s) raises Lh and Lm and
shifts production to the more productive modern sector (an increase in YM is greater than
a decrease in YT ), plus they and B increase NI, thereby raising the demand for good T and
thus P .34 The modern sector’s share in production increases with the proportion(s) (except
the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, where the eﬀect is ambiguous) but decreases with B.
When P =µ, by contrast, P does not depend on NI and thus Y and YM
Y
are independent
of B (and increase with the proportion(s)). The modern sector too produces goods for basic
consumption, i.e. CBM > 0, in this case. The proportion of basic consumption supplied by
the sector increases with B as well as the proportion(s), because CBM
PCB
= PCB¡PYT
PCB
=1¡ µYT
°BNI
and thus it increases with NI and decreases with YT =AT (1¡Lh¡Lm).
A.3 The dynamic equation of Bt and its ﬁxed point
This section examines the dynamic equation of Bt; (24), of Section 3.2 and its ﬁxed point.
When Fht
Fmt
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, if Fht+Fmt<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and thus Pt<µ, the equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+(1+r)Btg: (29)
°b
1¡°B (1+r)<1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given Fht+Fmt exists, which equals:bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt): (30)
Clearly, when Bt<(>) bB¤(Fht+Fmt), Bt+1>(<)Bt. If Fht+Fmt¸ (1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and
thus Pt=µ, the dynamic equation and its ﬁxed point equal:
Bt+1=°bffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (31)bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]g; (32)
where bB¤(Fht+Fmt) is an increasing function.
When Fht
Fmt
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), if Pt=P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)·µ, they equal:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B f[AM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (33)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)g; (34)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function. If P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)>µ (thus Pt=µ), they are:
34In the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, the eﬀect of Fh on YM is ambiguous and that of B is negative, but
their eﬀects on PYT are positive and dominate.
34
Bt+1=°bfAM(Fht)®(Fmt)1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)+(1+r)Btg; (35)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)g; (36)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function since fwht>gwmt>wlt=µAT .
When Fht
Fmt
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt < µAT , and Fht < F
y
h(Bt), if Fmt < Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the
equations are (33) and (34) above. If Fmt¸Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the dynamic equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B
©£
AM(Á(Fht;Bt))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;Bt)em)
¤
Fht+(1+r)Bt
ª
: (37)
The next lemma shows that, given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique ﬁxed
point of (37), B
¤
(Fht), and B
¤
(Fht) increases and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) decreases with Fht.
Lemma A3When the dynamics of Bt follow (37); given Fht, Bt converges monotonically
to unique B
¤
(Fht), which is a solution to
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))em)Fhtg; (38)
and when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. B
¤
(Fht) is increasing and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreas-
ing in Fht and limFht!0 Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht))=Á(0)´ limFht!0 Á(Fht;0).
When Fht
Fmt
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and either
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt<µAT and Fht¸F
y
h(Bt) or
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt¸µAT ,
Bt+1=°bffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)+(1+r)Btg; (39)
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)g; (40)
where B
¤
(Fht) is an increasing function.
A.4 Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states
The next proposition examines the steady states in terms of welfare, output, and sectoral
composition, based on Propositions A1 and A2 and Proposition 3 of Section 4.1.
Proposition A3 (Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states)
(i) Aggregate net income and average utility are highest in SS 1. They increase with Fh in
SS 2 and SS 3, and with Fh and Fm in SS 4. Their maxima in SS 2 and SS 3 are strictly
higher than in SS 4, and the inﬁnima in SS 2 are strictly higher than in SS 3 and SS 4.
(ii) The same result as (i) holds for aggregate output; except that the magnitude relation of
the maxima in SS 3 and SS 4 is unclear. In SS 1, YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
=1. In SS 2, if Fh<F
y
h,
YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
= [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1>(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where
®
1¡®
em
eh
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ; if Fh¸F yh and Fh1¡Fh ·(FhFm)ml;µ, YMY and CBMPCB increase with Fh;
otherwise, YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
=1. In SS 3, YM
Y
is constant. In SS 4, YM
Y
increases (decreases) with
Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
>(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
:35
35CBM = 0 in the case Fh<F
y
h of SS 2 and in SS 3 and SS 4.
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The proposition proves that SS 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income, average
utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but if they
are to be ranked, SS 2 is the second best, SS 3 follows, and SS 4 is the worst: the maximum
values of these variables in SS 2 and SS 3 (except aggregate output in SS 3) are strictly higher
than the ones in SS 4, and the inﬁnima in SS 2 are strictly higher than the ones in SS 3 and
SS 4. The three variables increase with the proportion(s) of those accessible to education
for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh in SS 2 and SS 3, and Fh and Fm in SS 4.
As for shares of the modern sector in production and in basic consumption, when P <µ
(thus CBM
PCB
=0), YM
Y
depends on Fh
Fm
and the relation can be non-monotonic: in the case Fh<
F yh of SS 2 and in SS 4,
YM
Y
decreases with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
< ®
1¡®
em
eh
(note ®
1¡®
em
eh
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi)
and the relation turns positive for Fh
Fm
> ®
1¡®
em
eh
if ®
1¡®
em
eh
< fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi: That is, the
production share decreases with Fh
Fm
when Fh
Fm
is relatively low. By contrast, when P =µ; i.e.
in the case Fh¸F yh and Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of SS 2,
YM
Y
and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh. (They equal
1 in SS 1 and in the case Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of SS 2;
YM
Y
(<1) is constant and CBM
PCB
=0 in SS 3.)
A.5 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
The next proposition presents the relationship between initial conditions and steady states.
Since the lengthy analysis of the dynamics is involved, the proof is provided in Appendix C
posted on the author’s website (http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html).
Proposition A4 (Initial conditions and steady states)
(i)When Fh0
Fm0
<fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi
a: If Fh0<F
[
h; Fht is constant, Fmt falls, and the economy most likely converges to SS 4.
36
b: If Fh0¸F [h; when Fh0¸F [h(B0), Fht is constant, Fmt increases, and the economy converges
to SS 2.37 When Fh0 <F
[
h(B0), at ﬁrst, Fht is constant and Fmt decreases, and it could
converge to any type of steady states or cycle.38
(ii)When Fh0
Fm0
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii
a: If b¤(wl)· em at (Fh;Fm;B) = (Fh0;Fm0;B¤(Fh0;Fm0)), Fht and Fmt are constant and the
ﬁnal state is SS 4.
b: Otherwise, Fht is constant, Fmt rises, and the economy converges to SS 2.
(iii)When Fh0
Fm0
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi ; Fht increases and Fht+Fmt non-decreases at ﬁrst.
36 Fmt could ”jump over” the region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehiidepending on the initial
distribution, in which case it converges to another type of steady states, particularly SS 3.
37The exception is when Fh0=F [h and B0=B
¤
(Fh0), in which case both Fmt and Bt are constant.
38The economy possibly cycles between the region FhFm <gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi and Fh 2 [F [h; F [h(B)) and the
region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii.
36
a: If Fh0
Fm0
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = bB¤(Fh0+Fm0), Fht+Fmt
is constant and the economy converges to SS 3.
b: If Fh0
Fm0
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl) · em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = B¤(Fh0;Fm0), the
following three scenarios are possible depending on details of the initial distribution.
1: The more likely is the same scenario as a:
2: Fht+Fmt rises from the start or after some period and the ﬁnal state is SS 1.
3: After Fht+Fmt increases for a while, Fht becomes constant, Fmt increases, and the
economy converges to SS 2.
The ﬁrst scenario is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are lower, and the second one is more
likely than the third one as Fh0
Fm0
is higher.
c: Otherwise, the same scenarios as 2: and 3: of b: are possible.
Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma A1. (Existence of function Á(¢)) Let Á= Fm
Fh
. Then, from (12) and (15),fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT is expressed as:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh ; (41)
where Fh<
1
1+Á
, Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
must be true. When Fh!0, the equation becomes:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B (1+r)B; (42)
whose solution Á=Á(B) ´ [ (1¡®)AM
(1+r)(
°B
1¡°B B+em)
]
1
® satisﬁes Á(B)·Á´Á(0)= [ (1¡®)AM
(1+r)em
]
1
® , where
Á is the solution to fwm=(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em=0. The LHS of (41) decreases and the
RHS increases with Á for Á<minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág; as Á! 0, LHS!+1 and thus LHS >RHS;
and as Á!minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág, LHS<RHS since, at Á=Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
, LHS=0 and RHS>0 (from
Á > [(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1 > [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, fwh > fwm = 0 and AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem) =fwh+Áfwm > 0),
and when 1¡Fh
Fh
·Á, RHS!+1 as Á! 1¡Fh
Fh
. Hence, for given Fh > 0 and B, a unique Á2
(0;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág) satisfying (41), denoted Á=Á(Fh; B), exists, and limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B).
(Properties of Á(¢)) The RHS of (41) is strictly increasing in Fh (< 11+Á) when Á 2
[[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág), because AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm> (1+Á)µAT >0 at
Á=[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 from Assumption 1. Thus, Á(Fh;B) is a decreasing function. Á(B)> [(FhFm)hm]
¡1
because fwm > µAT at Á = [(FhFm)hm]¡1 from Assumption 1 and fwm = °B1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT at
Á = Á(B) from (42). Then, since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) > [(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 and the limit of
Á(Fh;B) when Fh! 1
1+[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]¡1
is strictly less than [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 (from eq. 41), for given B,
there exists a unique Fh > 0 satisfying Á(Fh;B)=[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, which is denoted as F zh(B). The
existence of F yh(B) can be proved similarly. F
z
h(B)>F
y
h(B) is from Assumption 1.
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Proof of Lemma A2. From the proof of Lemma A1, Á(0)¸Á(B)> [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, fwm¸ (>)0
for Fh
Fm
¸ (>)[Á(0)]¡1, and fwh¸ fwm for FhFm · (FhFm)hm from the deﬁnition of (FhFm)hm. Thus, the
numerator of (15) and P (Fh;Fm;B) increase with Fh and Fm for
Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm].
From (15) and Á= Fm
Fh
, P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ is expressed as:
1
AT
°B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh =µ; (43)
where Fh <
1
1+Á
. For given Á 2 [[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;Á(0)], LHS = 1
AT
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µ when Fh = 0;
LHS!+1 when Fh! 11+Á ; and the LHS increases with Fh (AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm > 0). Hence, given B, for any FhFm 2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(FhFm)hm], there exists a unique Fh 2
(0; 1
1+[
Fh
Fm
]¡1
) satisfying P (Fh;Fh;B)=µ. When
Fh
Fm
> (<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and thus fwm( FhFm )> (<)µAT ,
at P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; fwm( FhFm )>(<)µAT =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , that is, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Fh>0, an equilibrium with Lh, Lm>0 always exists from
the shape of the production functions. Thus, equilibrium Lh and Lm must satisfy fwh¸ fwm
(thus Lh
Lm
·(Fh
Fm
)hm) and fwm¸wl. Since fwh= fwm>µAT ¸wl at LhLm =(FhFm)hm (from Assumption
1) and fwh(fwm) decreases (increases) with LhLm , equilibrium LhLm satisfying fwh= fwm=wl does
not exist. Hence, when fwh= fwm, fwm>wl, and when fwm=wl, fwh> fwm. In the former case,
Lh·Fh, Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm, and LhLm · FhFm , and in the latter, Lh=Fh, Lm·Fm, and LhLm ¸ FhFm .
(i) fwm = wl is not possible since fwh > fwm and LhLm = FhLm ¸ FhFm ¸ (FhFm)hm cannot hold
together. Thus, fwm>wl, Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm and LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFm . When FhFm =(FhFm)hm,fwh> fwm with Lh<Fh (since LhLm < FhFm = (FhFm)hm) and thus Lh=Fh, Lm=Fm, and fwh= fwm
in equilibrium. When Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh< fwm with Lh=Fh and thus Lh<Fh and fwh= fwm in
equilibrium. Values of Lh and Lm are obtained from
Lh
Lm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
(ii) If fwh= fwm, as shown above, LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFmmust hold, which implies LhLm · FhFm <
(Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh>fwm, a contradiction. Hence, fwh>fwm and Lh=Fh in equilibrium.
When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , the RHS of (15) is greater than µ for any equilibrium Lh and Lm
(since ewi>0), thus P =µ and wl=µAT in equilibrium. Hence, when FhFm 2 ((FhFm)ml;µ;(FhFm)hm),fwm>wl and Lm=Fm, and when FhFm ·(FhFm)ml;µ, fwm=wl and LhLm = FhLm =(FhFm)ml;µ.
When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT , since
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, from Lemma A1, Fh and Fm satisfyingfwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exist for any FhFm ¸ [Á(B)]¡1 and is expressed as Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh,
where Á(¢) is a decreasing function, and from Lemma A2, Fh and Fm satisfying P (Fh;Fm;B)=
µ exist for any Fh
Fm
¸ [Á(0)]¡1, where P (¢) is an increasing function. Note that (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ >
[Á(B)]¡1¸ [Á(0)]¡1 from (41) and (42) in the proof of Lemma A1 and °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT .
(a) When P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ, fwm( FhFm )>µAT >P (Fh;Fm;B)AT from FhFm > (FhFm)ml;µ. Hence,
Lm = Fm and fwm > µAT > wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT in equilibrium. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ,fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT = wl ¸ fwm( FhFm ) cannot be true since fwm( FhFm ) > µAT from
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Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. Hence, fwm>wl, Lm=Fm, and P =µ in equilibrium.
(b) 1. From Lemma A1 (see Figure 9 too), for any Fh
Fm
2 [ [Á(B)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ), there exists
Fh < F
y
h(B) satisfying Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ (then, Fm > Á(Fh;B)Fh
from Lemma A2) or when P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ and Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm( FhFm )·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT
and thus fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT =wl and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh in equilibrium, wherefwm = fwm( FhLm )< µAT from FhLm = 1Á(Fh;B) < 1Á(F yh(B);B) = (FhFm)ml;µ. When P (Fh;Fm;B)< µ and
Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm= fwm( FhFm )>P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =wl and Lm=Fm in equilibrium.
2. When Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Fh¸F yh(B), from Lemma A2 (see Figure 1 too), P (Fh;Fm;B)=
P (Fh;[
Fh
Fm
]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (Fh;[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (F
y
h(B);[(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1F yh(B);B) = µ. From
Lemma A2, when P (Fh;Fm;B)¸µ, Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh and thus fwm( FhFm )·µAT ·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT .
Hence, fwm= µAT =wl, P = µ, Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh, and fwh=fwh([(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1) in equilibrium.
Note that fwm=wl=P (Fh;Lm;B)AT <µAT (thus LhLm = FhLm >(FhFm)ml;µ) is not possible because,
from Lemma A2, if Fh
Lm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, fwm( FhLm )>P (Fh;Lm;B)AT when P (Fh;Lm;B)<µ.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From Proposition 1 (i), Lh
Lm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh = fwm =fwm((FhFm)hm), which is strictly greater than µAT (thus wl) from Assumption 1. By substitutingfwh= fwm= fwm((FhFm)hm) and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm into P (eq. 14) and equating it with µ,
°B
1¡°B
fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B
1¡(Fh+Fm) =µAT , Fh+Fm=
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°B fwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT : (44)
Thus, the result for wl holds. (ii) Straightforward from proofs of Proposition 1 (ii).
Proof of Lemma A3. From the proof of Lemma A2, Á=Á(Fht;Bt) is a solution to
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
[AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)]Fht+(1+r)Bt
1¡(1+Á)Fht . (45)
where the ﬁrst term of the numerator of the RHS equals fwht+Ágwmt > 0 from (11) and
(12). Since the LHS decreases with Á and the RHS and its denominator increase with Á, its
numerator increases with Bt. Thus, the numerator of the RHS of (37) is positive at Bt=0
and is increasing in Bt. Further, for any Bt>0,
@RHS
@Bt
= °b
1¡°B
n£
(1¡®)AM(Á(Fht;Bt))¡®¡(1+r)em
¤
Fht
@Á(Fht;Bt)
@Bt
+(1+r)
o
< °b(1+r)
1¡°B <1: (46)
Hence, for given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique solution to (38), B
¤
(Fht), and
when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. From (45) and (38), Á=Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is a solution to:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)
1¡(1+Á)Fht Fht: (47)
Thus, Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreasing in Fht and, as Fht!0, Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))!Á(0)´ [ (1¡®)AM(1+r)em ]
1
® .
Finally, dB
¤
(Fht)
dFht
>0 is from (24) and Proposition A1 (ii)(b) 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3. In a steady state, relative positions of the critical loci determining
the dynamics of Fh and Fm and the magnitude relation of P and µ are illustrated by Figure
5. In the region satisfying b¤(fwm)>eh and b¤(wl)>em of the ﬁgure, Fh and Fh+Fm increase
when Fh < 1, thus Fh < 1 cannot be a steady state. Hence, (Fh;Fm) = (1;0) is the only
steady state (SS 1). Since Fh
Fm
=+1> (Fh
Fm
)hm and P = µ from the ﬁgure, B = bB¤(1) holds
from (32). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm) · eh and b¤(wl) > em, Fh is constant and Fm
increases when Fh+Fm < 1, thus steady states are such that Fm = 1¡Fh and Fh satisﬁes
b¤(fwm)· eh, FhFm = Fh1¡Fh · fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh] (from the paragraph just after Assumption 3)
and b¤(wl)>em,Fh>F [h (from eq. 28) [SS 2]. Since Lm=maxfÁ(Fh; B
¤
(Fh));[(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1gFh
when Fh
Fm
= Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Lm = Fm when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from Proposition 1, B =
B
¤
(Fh) when
Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from (38) and (40), and B =B
¤(Fh;Fm) when Fh1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ
from P = µ and (36). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm) > eh and b¤(wl) · em, Fh increases
and Fm decreases when Fm > 0, thus steady states are such that Fm = 0 and Fh satisﬁes
b¤(wl)·em,Fh·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em (from eq. 26) [SS 3]. Since P <µ from the
ﬁgure, B = bB¤(Fh) holds from (30). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm)· eh and b¤(wl)· em,
Fh is constant and Fm decreases (is constant) when b
¤(fwm) < (¸)em, thus steady states
are: Fh and Fm satisfying em · b¤(fwm) · eh , FhFm 2 hfwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em];fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh]i
and b¤(wl)·em,P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT · 1¡°b(1+r)°b em (from eq. 27), and B = B¤(Fh;Fm)
(from eq. 34) [SS 4]; and Fh=F
[
h; Fm¸ Á(F [h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h (thus
Fh
Fm
< fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em]); and
B=B
¤
(Fh) (see footnote 26).
In SS 2, from the ﬁgure and the result on B, P = P (Fh;Lm;B
¤
(Fh))< µ if Fh · F yh and
P = µ otherwise. In SS 3, P = P (Lh;Lm; bB¤(Fh)) = °B1¡°B¡°b(1+r) gwm((FhFm)hm)FhAT (1¡Fh) from (15), (30),
and fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm). Levels of Lh, Lm, and Ll; and wages are from Propositions 1
and 2 and the result on P .
Proof of Proposition A3. (i) From Proposition A1 (i), aggregate net income (NI) and
average utility of SS 1 are strictly greater than those of SS 3, and they increase with Fh in
SS 3 (B = bB¤(Fh) from Proposition 3.). In SS 2, when Fh1¡Fh ·(FhFm)ml;µ, they increase with Fh
from Propositions A1 (ii)(b) and 3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)), while when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, they increase
with Fh because NI =
1
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fh)®(1¡Fh)1¡®¡(1+r)[ehFh+em(1¡Fh)]g (note fwh> fwm)
and average utility equals a constant times NI from the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a),
Proposition 3 (Fm = 1¡Fh, B =B¤(Fh;Fm); and P = µ), and (36). Since NI and average
utility of SS 1 equal those when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and the above proof of their
being increasing in Fh when
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2(fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh];(FhFm)hm] as
well, these variables of SS 2 are strictly smaller than those of SS 1. In SS 4, they increase
with Fh and Fm from Propositions A1 (ii)(a) and 3 (B = B
¤(Fh;Fm)). In SS 4, they are
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highest when b¤(fwm)= eh and b¤(wl)= em,P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT = 1¡°b(1+r)°b em; because
they are highest on b¤(wl) = em from Figure 5 and increase with Fh among steady states
on the locus from (25) and their expressions in the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a). (Note
that the absolute value of the slope of the locus is less than 1.) The highest NI and average
utility of SS 4 are strictly lower than those of SS 3, since the latter coincide with those when
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)=em. They are also strictly lower than those of SS 2, since they are
highest at b¤(fwm) = eh in both SSs. They are at the inﬁnimum when Fh! 0 in SS 3, and
when Fh
Fm
= fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em] and Fh! 0 in SS 4, hence the inﬁnima equal 0. The inﬁnima
of SS 2 are strictly higher than the ones in SS 3 and SS 4, since the former coincide with
the NI and average utility at the intersection of b¤(fwm)=em and b¤(wl)=em of SS 4.
(ii) In SS 3, Y increases with Fh from Propositions A2 (i) and 3 (B = bB¤(Fh)), and YMY
is constant from the proof of Proposition A2 (i) and (30). Y is strictly lower than in SS
1, since it increases with Fh when b
¤(wl) > em too. In SS 2, when Fh < F
y
h , Y increases
with Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) and 3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)). From the proof of Proposition A2
(ii)(b) and (38), Y =AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh+
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)[AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh¡(1+r)(eh+
Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))em)Fh](the ﬁrst term is YM): Hence,
YM
Y
=f1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [1¡1+rAM (
eh
(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))1¡®
+
em(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
®)]g¡1 and YM
Y
increases (decreases) with [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1>
(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em] can be proved as follows. First, Assumption 2
implies ®AM((
Fh
Fm
)hm)
¡(1¡®) > eh
°b
, ®AM(FhFm)¡(1¡®)¡ (1+ r)eh < (1¡®)AM(FhFm)®¡ (1+ r)em at
Fh
Fm
=(°b®AM
eh
)
1
1¡®,AM®®(1¡®)1¡®> e
®
h
°b
[eh¡°b(1+r)(eh¡em)]1¡®: Then, the last equation proves
®
1¡®
em
eh
>fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em],°b(1¡®)AM( ®1¡® emeh )®>em,AM®®(1¡®)1¡®> e®he1¡®m°b . When Fh¸
F yh and
Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Y ,
YM
Y
; and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) and
3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)). When
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; Y increases with Fh from Proposition 3 (Fm = 1¡Fh
and P =µ) and the proof of Proposition A2 (ii)(a) (Y =AM(Fh)
®(1¡Fh)1¡®), and YMY =1 and
CBM
PCB
=1 from Proposition 3 (YT = 0): The highest Y of SS 2 (at b
¤(fwm)=eh) is strictly lower
than Y of SS 1, because the latter coincides with Y when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and
the above proof of Y increasing with Fh applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2(fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh];(FhFm)hm] as well.
In SS 4, Y increases with Fh and FM from Propositions A2 (ii)(a) and 3 (B=B
¤(Fh;Fm)).
Since Y =AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)] from the proof
of Proposition A2 (ii)(a) and (34), YM
Y
=f1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [1¡1+rAM (eh(
Fh
Fm
)1¡®+em(FhFm)
¡®)]g¡1 and
thus YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
> (<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
. From Figure 5, for given Fh
Fm
, Y
in SS 4 is strictly lower than in SS 2. Thus, the highest Y in SS 4 is strictly lower than in
SS 2. The inﬁnimum in SS 2 is proved to be strictly higher than in SS 3 and SS 4 in the
same way as (i).
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